We praise the first Gulf War now. Yet, almost immediately in its aftermath, critics accused us of overkill, of using too many soldiers to blast too many poor Iraqis. The charge then was not that we had too few troops, but too many; not that the Pentagon had understated the need for troops, but overstated and sent too many; not that we had too few allies, but an unwieldy coalition that hampered American options; not that the effort was too costly, but that we were too crassly commercial in forcing allies to pony up cash as if war were supposed to be a profitable enterprise.
The generic criticism in the 1990s of the United States, both here and abroad, was that America bombed from on high, and sometimes, as in Belgrade or Africa, even indiscriminately — its only concern being fear of losses, not worry over civilian collateral damage or ending the war decisively on the ground.
Damned if you do, damned if you don't. In the meantime, the French sit back and drink Perrier. And voient la vie en rose. But what's that fire in the distance?
This article is among the best from VDH. That other one I posted yesterday was good too. You know, ithere are too few reminders of the criticisms of GW I. In learning from the mistakes then very well, the current Admin has brought on the opposite criticisms. Like you say, damned if you do...
The only Criticism I had of the handling of the first Gulf War is that it was cut short too soon, and allowed Hussein to regroup and retain power. Otherwise, it was done absolutely the right way. The ratio of praise to criticism, from me, for this current war, goes the other way. If the powers that be in the Bush administration intentionally tried to do things "minimally" as response to previous criticism of overdoing it in the first war, then they are even bigger idiots than I thought.
3 comments:
We praise the first Gulf War now. Yet, almost immediately in its aftermath, critics accused us of overkill, of using too many soldiers to blast too many poor Iraqis. The charge then was not that we had too few troops, but too many; not that the Pentagon had understated the need for troops, but overstated and sent too many; not that we had too few allies, but an unwieldy coalition that hampered American options; not that the effort was too costly, but that we were too crassly commercial in forcing allies to pony up cash as if war were supposed to be a profitable enterprise.
The generic criticism in the 1990s of the United States, both here and abroad, was that America bombed from on high, and sometimes, as in Belgrade or Africa, even indiscriminately — its only concern being fear of losses, not worry over civilian collateral damage or ending the war decisively on the ground.
Damned if you do, damned if you don't. In the meantime, the French sit back and drink Perrier. And voient la vie en rose. But what's that fire in the distance?
This article is among the best from VDH. That other one I posted yesterday was good too.
You know, ithere are too few reminders of the criticisms of GW I. In learning from the mistakes then very well, the current Admin has brought on the opposite criticisms.
Like you say, damned if you do...
The only Criticism I had of the handling of the first Gulf War is that it was cut short too soon, and allowed Hussein to regroup and retain power. Otherwise, it was done absolutely the right way. The ratio of praise to criticism, from me, for this current war, goes the other way. If the powers that be in the Bush administration intentionally tried to do things "minimally" as response to previous criticism of overdoing it in the first war, then they are even bigger idiots than I thought.
Post a Comment