The essential problem with our conduct of the Iraq war has not been one of materials and numbers [these we could always have put in if the administration had so willed it], it has been one of confusion as to purpose, an inexcusable refusal to think through, or at least articulate, what the goal of the war was after the fall of Saddam [it clearly, despite Bush allowing us rubes to have hopes for it, wasn't to overthrow the poisonous regimes surrounding Iraq and give democracy a genuine fighting chance within Islam]. Beyond the stimulus of a "troop surge" and any pavlovian reflexes is the question which so far Bush's administration has not answered, or even previously acknowledged as having been asked. Namely, what aim are you trying to achieve with these troops, and how to you intend to reach that aim [other than simply piling on more soldiers onto Iraqui soil]? Then we can ask further questions, such as whether the aim given is commensurate with the loss of life entailed [e.g. are you aiming for the military defeat, or surrender, of the Iranian and Syrian governments who have been fighting us with their proxies in Iraq? In other words, are you aiming at last for a victory that has legs? If so, and assuming you actually this time will act accordingly and not simply spew out rhetoric, then the greater risk to our soldiers can be justified. However, if you throw out some hackneyed pseudo-vietnam version of a policing and "pacifying" action, pretending that a little moderate pressure and cadres of diplomats can get Baathists and Mullahs on our side, then you will simply cause our soldiers to die for no good reason at all. And there has been too much of that so far. And so on, and so on....], and if the administration has the will, and the will to get the american public behind that will, to carry out that action....well, you get the picture. By now no doubt we all have a favorite stock of questions we wish someone would ask of our politicos ...
Hanson, being the military historian guy, and smarter than I, is the one you should read for deeper thought on this....
Friday, January 05, 2007
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2 comments:
It sounds plausible. Sometimes the problem with Conservative Historians is that they tend to focus on the troops and battles (that's their strength). They shouldn't overlook the Homefront, however, and what can and should be done to provide intellectual substance to why we're fighting in the first place. Intellectual history in tandem with military and political and social?
William Tecumseh Sherman’s Army of the West finally reached a level of nearly 100,000 troops in late summer 1864. Yet its success was predicated not on increased numbers per se, but rather on a radical shift in tactics, abandoning reliance on rail support and living off the land. When Sherman left on his March to the Sea, he actually pruned his forces. A good argument could be made that Lee finally cracked, not because Grant’s surges smashed his lines, but due to southern desertion and loss of morale, once it was known that a huge and unpredictable Union army under the unconventional Sherman was approaching the Confederate rear through the Carolinas.
Way to go, Tecumseh! Where have you gone, Billy T? We need ya.
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